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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
∗ The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, District Judge of the 
Massachusetts District Court, sitting by designation 
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 Appellant Carol Lee Walker commenced this action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  She alleges that Appellees—a 
prosecutor and a special agent employed by the Pennsylvania 
Office of the Attorney General (OAG)—violated her Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search 
when they used an invalid subpoena to induce Walker’s 
employer, Pennsylvania State University (Penn State), to 
produce her work emails.  The District Court granted 
Appellees’ motion to dismiss, concluding that they were 
entitled to qualified immunity because Walker did not have a 
clearly established right to privacy in the content of her work 
emails.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the 
dismissal of Walker’s § 1983 claim.  We will vacate the 
District Court’s denial of Walker’s subsequent motion for 
leave to file a second amended complaint, asserting claims 
under the Stored Communications Act (SCA),1 and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
I. 
This case stems from a criminal prosecution brought 
against Walker by the OAG.  In July 2015, the OAG filed 
criminal charges against Walker in state court, which 
included numerous counts of forgery and various computer 
crime offenses.  These charges were joined with prior charges 
that had been filed against Walker’s husband, Ray Allen 
Walker, Jr., and his trucking company.  Appellee Brian 
Coffey, a senior deputy attorney general, was the prosecutor 
assigned to the case, and Appellee Paul Zimmerer, an OAG 
                                              
1 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.  Throughout her filings, Walker 
sometimes erroneously refers to the SCA as the “Secured” 
Communications Act.   
4 
 
special agent, served as the lead investigator.  Following a 
preliminary hearing in August 2015, some of the charges 
against Walker were dismissed, but four counts of conspiracy 
to commit forgery remained pending. 
 
In October 2015, before her trial had been scheduled, 
Coffey and Zimmerer sought to obtain Walker’s work emails 
from her employer, Penn State, as part of their investigation.  
Coffey and Zimmerer initially asked Penn State to produce 
Walker’s work emails voluntarily, but Penn State officials 
requested formal documentation, saying, “We just need 
something formal, a subpoena.”2  Coffey and Zimmerer then 
obtained a blank subpoena form from the Centre County 
Court of Common Pleas, which they filled out in part.  The 
subpoena includes the case caption, is addressed to “John 
Corro, PSU General Counsel & Senior Security / Systems 
Analyst,” and requests production of “any & all 
emails/computer files/documents/attachments to or from 
Carol Lee Walker at her email address, to or from the 
following email addresses: . . ..”3  The seven listed email 
addresses appear to belong to either Walker’s husband or his 
business.  The subpoena is blank as to the date, time, and 
place of production and the party on behalf of whom 
testimony is required.  As such, Appellees concede that the 
subpoena was, on its face, incomplete and unenforceable.  On 
October 21, 2015, Zimmerer presented the unenforceable 
subpoena to Katherine Allen, Assistant General Counsel at 
Penn State.  Under Allen’s direction, Penn State employees 
searched for the requested emails and turned them over to 
Zimmerer.  At some point after Penn State produced the 
                                              
2 App. at 150-51. 
3 App. at 49.   
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emails, the remaining criminal charges against Walker were 
dismissed with prejudice, nolle prosequi. 
 
 Walker then filed this § 1983 action against Zimmerer 
and Coffey, alleging that their use of an invalid subpoena to 
obtain Walker’s work emails violated her right to be free 
from unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution.4  Zimmerer and Coffey both moved to 
dismiss, arguing, in part, that they were entitled to qualified 
immunity because Walker did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in her work emails or, if she did, that 
right was not clearly established.   
 
 The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, 
agreeing that Zimmerer and Coffey were entitled to qualified 
immunity.  The court concluded that Walker could not show a 
clearly established right to privacy in the content of her work 
emails.5  Following the dismissal of her case, Walker filed a 
motion for reconsideration of the District Court’s ruling and 
for leave to file a second amended complaint.  Walker’s 
proposed second amended complaint was filed as an 
attachment to her motion.  The proposed complaint included a 
new claim for violation of the SCA and pleaded additional 
                                              
4 Walker’s complaint also alleged a violation of Article I, 
section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.  The District 
Court dismissed this claim on the grounds that Pennsylvania 
law does not provide a private right of action allowing 
plaintiffs to seek money damages for violations of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.  App. at 20.  Walker does not 
challenge that ruling on appeal.   
5 Walker v. Coffey, No. 17-40, 2017 WL 1477144, at *6-*9 
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2017).   
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facts regarding Penn State’s role as both Walker’s employer 
and Walker’s internet service provider (ISP), the measures 
Walker took to protect the privacy of her work email account, 
and the Penn State internet privacy policy applicable at the 
time of the search.  In a short memorandum order, the District 
Court denied Walker’s motion.  Ignoring the SCA claim, the 
court simply concluded that, even if it were to allow Walker 
to file her proposed second amended complaint, the additional 
factual allegations therein would not alter the court’s prior 
conclusion that the Defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity. 
 
Walker now appeals both the District Court’s dismissal 
of her complaint on qualified immunity grounds and the 
District Court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration and 
leave to file a second amended complaint. 
 
II. 
The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction over the District Court’s final orders pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
“We review a motion to dismiss based on the defense 
of qualified immunity de novo as it involves a pure question 
of law.”6  We review a district court’s denial of a motion for 
                                              
6 McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 2001).  
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“Qualified immunity shields government officials from 
civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory 
or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time 
of the challenged conduct.”8  Qualified immunity is a strong 
shield and protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those 
who knowingly violate the law.”9  “To resolve a claim of 
qualified immunity, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry:  
(1) whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the violation of a 
constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was ‘clearly 
established’ at the time of the official’s conduct.”10  A court 
may address either of these questions first, “in light of the 
circumstances in the particular case at hand,”11 and the 
Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of 
                                              
7 Budhun v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 259 
(3d Cir. 2014); Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 258 
(3d Cir. 2005).   
8 Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
9 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
10 L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 
2016).  
11 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).   
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resolving qualified immunity questions at the earliest possible 
stage in litigation.”12   
 
 When considering whether a right is clearly 
established for purposes of qualified immunity, a court must, 
as a threshold matter, identify the scope of the right at issue.  
The Supreme Court has emphasized that, for purposes of this 
inquiry, a court must define or identify the right at a 
particularized level.13  “A Government official’s conduct 
violates clearly established law when, at the time of the 
challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] 
sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have 
understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”14  
Although the Supreme Court “do[es] not require a case 
directly on point, . . . existing precedent must have placed the 
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”15  A 
plaintiff must identify either “controlling authority in the[] 




Consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedent, we 
begin our analysis by identifying the constitutional right at 
                                              
12 Id. at 232 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 
(1991) (per curiam)).   
13 See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).   
14 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting 
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).  
15 Id.  
16 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).   
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issue, as “particularized to the facts of the case.”17  Thus, for 
purposes of qualified immunity, we must consider, at a 
minimum, whether it is clearly established that the Fourth 
Amendment affords an employee, such as Walker, the right to 
have the contents of her work emails remain free from a law 
enforcement search, absent a warrant or valid exception to the 
warrant requirement.  Because we conclude that such a right 
is not clearly established—especially where, as here, the 
employer ultimately produces the emails to law 
enforcement—we hold that Appellees are entitled to qualified 
immunity.   
 
1. 
“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is 
whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable 
expectation of privacy.’”18  Courts answer this question 
through a two-part test, examining both subjective and 
objective expectations of privacy.  First, a court considers 
whether an individual has “manifested a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged 
search.”19  Second, a court considers whether “society [is] 
willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”20  
                                              
17 White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam).   
18 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)).   
19 Id.   
20 Id.; see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 
(1984) (noting that a “search,” for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, “occurs when an expectation of privacy that society 
is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed”).   
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Throughout this litigation, Walker’s subjective expectation of 
privacy in her work emails has not been contested.  Thus, our 
analysis focuses on whether Walker enjoyed an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of her work 
emails. 
 
When conducting such analysis, the Supreme Court 
has historically expressed sensitivity to advances in 
technology,21 though in recent years the Court has also 
exercised caution in this area.22  In addition, although the 
Fourth Amendment “protects people not places,”23 the 
caselaw consistently recognizes that objective expectations of 
privacy in the workplace are distinct from those in other 
contexts.24  In analyzing Walker’s claim, we are therefore 
mindful of this delicate balance.  
 
The Supreme Court’s early decisions addressing the 
Fourth Amendment’s application to telephone calls provide 
our initial foundation.  In United States v. Katz, the Court first 
                                              
21 See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (holding that failure to 
recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone 
booth would “ignore the vital role that the public telephone 
has come to play in private communication”).   
22 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) 
(“The Court must proceed with care when considering the 
whole concept of privacy expectations in communications 
made on electronic equipment . . .. The judiciary risks error 
by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment 
implications of emerging technology before its role in society 
has become clear.”).   
23 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.   
24 See, e.g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968).   
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recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content 
of a telephone call made from a public phone booth.25  The 
Court concluded that the government’s use of an electronic 
listening device to record the call constituted a search that, 
absent a warrant or valid exception to the warrant 
requirement, violated the Fourth Amendment.26  Next, in 
Smith v. Maryland, the Court addressed the government’s use 
of a pen register to record the number dialed from an 
individual’s home telephone.27  After reaffirming Katz’s 
holding that the content of a phone call is protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court concluded that telephone users 
do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
numbers that they dial.28  Whereas the holding of Katz 
reflected widely-held expectations that the words spoken into 
the mouthpiece of a phone will remain private, the Smith 
Court reasoned that no such expectation existed for the 
numbers a user dials, because the numbers, unlike the content 
of the calls, are voluntarily turned over to the phone 
company.29 
 
The core holding of Smith rested upon the established 
rule that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”30  This 
principle—the third-party doctrine—has arisen in a variety of 
contexts.  With regard to communications, the third-party 
doctrine often dictates distinct treatment for the content of 
                                              
25 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.   
26 Id.  
27 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.   
28 Id. at 743.   
29 Id. at 742-44.   
30 Id. at 743-44.   
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communications as opposed to surface-level identifying 
information or metadata.  Notably, the rules established for 
telephone calls in Katz and Smith align with prior and 
subsequent Supreme Court caselaw applying the Fourth 
Amendment to physical mail:  Senders enjoy a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the content of their letters and 
packages, but not in information readily discernable from the 
surface of a mailed item, such as the address.31   
 
Content, however, is not categorically protected; 
content that is turned over to a third party is not subject to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  Smith drew upon the 
Court’s prior decision in United States v. Miller, which 
addressed an account holder’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy in checks and bank records.32  The Miller Court 
concluded that because the documents “contain[ed] only 
information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to 
their employees in the ordinary course of business,” the 
account holder had “no legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ in 
their contents.”33 
                                              
31 See, e.g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114 (“Letters and other 
sealed packages are in the general class of effects in which 
the public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy; 
warrantless searches of such effects are presumptively 
unreasonable.”); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) 
(“Letters and sealed packages . . . in the mail are as fully 
guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their 
outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the 
parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.”).   
32 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 438-39 (1976).   
33 Id. at 442.   
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As technology has advanced, courts have grappled 
with defining objective expectations of privacy in the content 
of electronic communications.  And those expectations can be 
even harder to define in the workplace context.  City of 
Ontario v. Quon posed the question whether a police officer 
enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of 
text messages sent from his City-issued pager.34   The 
Supreme Court declined to resolve the question definitively.  
Instead, after noting the risk of “elaborating too fully on the 
Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology 
before its role in society has become clear,”35 the Court 
assumed arguendo that “Quon had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the text messages sent on the pager provided to 
him by the City” and that a search had occurred for purposes 
of the Fourth Amendment.36  The Court nevertheless 
concluded that the search was reasonable because, pursuant to 
an established Fourth Amendment exception, it was 
conducted by Quon’s employer for a legitimate work-related 
purpose.37   
 
Only months after Quon was decided, the Eleventh 
Circuit, in Rehberg v. Paulk,38 confronted a set of facts 
similar to those of our present case.  The defendants in that 
case—a state prosecutor and law enforcement investigator—
had been investigating Rehberg and issued an allegedly 
defective subpoena to Rehberg’s ISP in order to obtain emails 
                                              
34 560 U.S. 746, 750 (2010).   
35 Id. at 759.   
36 Id. at 760.   
37 Id. at 764-65.   
38 611 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2010).   
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sent and received from Rehberg’s personal computer.39  
Rehberg later filed a § 1983 action alleging, among other 
claims, that the subpoena violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights.  After noting the paucity of caselaw addressing Fourth 
Amendment protection of email content and the “marked lack 
of clarity in what privacy expectations as to content of 
electronic communications are reasonable,”40 the Eleventh 
Circuit, relying on Quon, concluded that the case presented 
“‘far-reaching’ legal issues that [the court] should be cautious 
about resolving too broadly.”41  Rather than attempting to 
resolve those issues, the Eleventh Circuit simply concluded 
that a right to privacy in the content of email communications 
was not clearly established.42  Notably, the Eleventh Circuit 
acknowledged the apparent relevance of the Supreme Court’s 
precedents governing telephone communications, but found 
those cases were not dispositive.  As the court explained, 
“The Supreme Court’s decisions in Katz and Smith clearly 
established an objectively reasonable privacy right in 
telephone conversation content, but, as the modern Internet 
did not exist at the time of those decisions, whether the 
analytical framework, much less the rationale, of those 
decisions transfers to privacy rights in Internet email is 
questionable and far from clearly established.”43 
Several months later, the Sixth Circuit took a different 
approach in United States v. Warshak.44  In Warshak, law 
                                              
39 Id. at 835.   
40 Id. at 843-44.   
41 Id. at 846.   
42 Id. at 847.   
43 Id.  
44 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).   
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enforcement agents, relying on section 2703(b) of the SCA,45 
had obtained a subpoena compelling Warshak’s ISP to 
produce the contents of approximately 27,000 emails sent or 
received from Warshak’s account.  Warshak moved to 
suppress, arguing that the government’s warrantless search 
and seizure of his emails violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights.46  After reviewing the case law discussed above, the 
Sixth Circuit concluded that, “[g]iven the fundamental 
similarities between email and traditional forms of 
communication, it would defy common sense to afford emails 
lesser Fourth Amendment protection.”47  The court found that 
an ISP is “the functional equivalent of a post office or 
telephone company,” and, as a result, “the government cannot 
compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of email 
without triggering the Fourth Amendment.”48 Addressing the 
potential applicability of the third-party doctrine, the Sixth 
Circuit, drawing on Katz and Smith, held that the “mere 
ability” of an ISP to access the content of emails is not 
“sufficient to extinguish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”49  The Sixth Circuit distinguished Miller on the 
grounds that Warshak’s ISP, unlike the bank in Miller, was an 
intermediary rather than the intended recipient of the material 
in question. 
 
Walker argues, in short, that Warshak should carry the 
day.  She characterizes the Sixth Circuit’s decision as a 
straightforward and modest application of the Supreme 
                                              
45 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b).   
46 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 282.   
47 Id. at 285-86.   
48 Id. at 286.   
49 Id. at 286-87.   
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Court’s precedents on mail and telephone communications to 
the field of electronic communications.  But Walker has 
failed to identify, nor can we, a “robust consensus of cases of 
persuasive authority”50 supporting the position she advances.  
To the contrary, at present Warshak remains closer to a lonely 
outlier than to a representation of consensus.  Although 
Warshak arguably tracks a longstanding distinction in Fourth 
Amendment law between content and metadata, that 
distinction is not dispositive, as content is not uniformly 
protected.51  As Quon and Rehberg recognized, electronic 
communications present new considerations, and perhaps 
distinguishing features, that may counsel caution rather than a 
rote application of older precedents addressing other forms of 
communication.  Moreover, the Fourth Amendment issues in 
Warshak arose in the context of suppression of evidence.  
Thus, the Sixth Circuit did not face the question that we must 
answer:  whether the particular Fourth Amendment right was 
clearly established.   
 
As such, we would be hard put to find that Walker 
enjoyed a clearly established right to privacy in the content of 
her work emails.  But because this case involves Walker’s 
work emails, which were produced to law enforcement by her 
employer, Penn State, our inquiry does not end there.  As 
explained below, those facts remove any doubt that Walker 
has failed to allege a violation of a clearly established 
constitutional right.   
2. 
                                              
50 L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d at 248 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
51 See, e.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.   
17 
 
Most of the cases discussed above address the 
reasonable expectation of privacy in personal 
communications.  Here, it is undisputed that the 
communications in question were sent or received from 
Walker’s work email account.  And although the Fourth 
Amendment affords employees a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the content of certain work-related 
communications and files, an employee’s Fourth Amendment 
rights in the workplace are subject to additional exceptions 
and limitations.   
 
The Supreme Court has recognized that employees 
may be entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contents of documents stored in the workplace, both in the 
private52 and public53 sectors.  At the same time, public 
employers remain free to conduct a warrantless search of an 
employee’s files or communications if the search is 
“conducted for a ‘noninvestigatory, work-related purpos[e]’ 
or for the ‘investigatio[n] of work-related misconduct.’”54  
This rule is consistent with the nature of an employer-
employee relationship and reflects an understanding that, 
although employees may have certain privacy interests in 
their work-related documents and communications vis-à-vis 
outsiders, their privacy interests vis-à-vis their employer are 
far more circumscribed.   
 
                                              
52 Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368-70 (1968).   
53 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (extending 
the holding of Mancusi to public sector employees). 
54 Quon, 560 U.S. at 761 (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 
725-26).   
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In a similar vein, courts have long recognized that 
employers, as third parties who possess common authority 
over the workplace, may independently consent to a search of 
an employee’s workplace documents or communications.55  
This rule is a logical application, in the workplace context, of 
general principles governing third-party consent.  An 
individual or entity exercising common authority over the 
place or thing to be searched may independently consent to a 
search.56   
 
More recently, the Ninth Circuit addressed the 
application of this principle to modern workplace technology.  
United States v. Ziegler57 involved an investigation into an 
employee who, law enforcement believed, had been accessing 
child pornography on his work computer.  Following several 
conversations with an FBI agent, employees from the 
company’s IT department made a copy of the suspect-
employee’s hard drive and produced it to the FBI.  After 
finding, pursuant to Mancusi and O’Connor, that the suspect-
employee enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
                                              
55 See, e.g., Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369 (holding that an 
employee could reasonably have expected that documents 
stored in a shared office “would not be touched except with 
the[] permission [of co-occupants of the office] or that of 
[workplace supervisors]”).   
56 See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 
(1974) (holding that the government “may show that 
permission to search was obtained from a third party who 
possessed common authority over or other sufficient 
relationship to the premises or effects sought to be 
inspected”).   
57 474 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2007).   
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contents of his work computer, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless 
concluded that the search of the computer was permissible 
because the FBI had obtained consent from the employer, 
who exercised common authority over the workplace 
computer at issue.58 
 
We reach the same conclusion here.  There is no 
dispute that the emails in question were sent or received via 
Walker’s work email address, as part of an email system 
controlled and operated by Penn State.  Thus, for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment, the emails were subject to the 
common authority of Walker’s employer.  Walker did not 
enjoy any reasonable expectation of privacy vis-à-vis Penn 
State, and Penn State could independently consent to a search 
of Walker’s work emails.  Upon receipt of the subpoena, 
Penn State exercised its independent authority to consent to a 
search and produced Walker’s work emails.59   
 
Walker argues that we should find Penn State’s 
consent invalid because it was procured through fraud or 
coercion, via the invalid subpoena.  She notes that a law 
enforcement officer cannot evade the limitations of the Fourth 
Amendment by inducing private parties to do what they 
cannot.  With that proposition, we agree.  But Walker fails to 
recognize that Penn State was not merely a private party 
induced to perform a search; rather, it was a third party with 
common authority over Walker’s emails and the independent 
ability to consent to a search.  As alleged in Walker’s 
                                              
58 Id. at 1190-91.   
59 In holding that Penn State had joint control over Walker’s 
work emails, we need not address the government’s argument 
that the third party doctrine applies.   
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complaint, Appellees presented the subpoena to Penn State’s 
Assistant General Counsel.60   Rather than contest the validity 
of the subpoena or otherwise limit any search, the Assistant 
General Counsel instructed an employee in her office to assist 
with the production of Walker’s emails.61  That decision was 
within the authority of Penn State—acting through its 
attorney—as Walker’s employer.  Under these circumstances, 
despite the facial invalidity of the subpoena, we decline to 
find that the university’s consent was coerced.62   
 
We emphasize that nothing in this opinion should be 
taken as condoning the actions of Appellees in this case.  On 
the contrary we are dismayed by their reliance on an invalid 
subpoena to procure the documents that they sought.  And we 
add a note of caution that, under slightly difference 
circumstances, similar actions might well lead us to a 
conclusion opposite from the one we reach today.  But 
improper conduct alone does not result in a forfeiture of 
qualified immunity.63  Rather, the relevant question is 
whether, under the particular circumstances of this case, 
Appellees’ conduct violated Walker’s clearly established 
                                              
60 App. at 39.   
61 App. at 39.   
62 Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) 
(“[T]he question whether a consent to a search was in fact 
‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express 
or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the 
totality of all the circumstances.”).   
63 See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 (1984) (“Officials 
sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified 
immunity merely because their conduct violates some 
statutory or administrative provision.”).  
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constitutional rights.  Because we conclude that it did not, 
Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity.  We will 
therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Walker’s § 
1983 claim.   
 
C.  
 Walker also appeals the denial of her subsequent 
motion for reconsideration and for leave to file a second 
amended complaint.  Attached to Walker’s motion was a 
proposed second amended complaint, which included a new 
claim alleging violation of the SCA.64  The District Court 
denied Walker’s motion in a brief memorandum order that 
focused solely on reconsideration of Walker’s § 1983 claim 
and made no mention of Walker’s attempt to assert a new 
claim under the SCA.65   
 
 For the reasons stated at length above, we agree that 
Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity as to Walker’s § 
1983 claim, and the District Court therefore did not err in 
denying reconsideration.  At present, however, we have 
insufficient information to determine whether Walker could 
plead a valid claim under the SCA.  We therefore conclude 
that, as to Walker’s attempt to assert a new claim under the 
SCA, the District Court abused its discretion by denying out 
of hand Walker’s motion for leave to file a second amended 
complaint.  We will therefore vacate in part the District 
                                              
64 App. at 105.   
65 App. at 28-30.   
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Court’s order of May 17, 2017, and remand this matter to the 
District Court to address the SCA issue in the first instance.66   
 
IV. 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of Walker’s § 1983 claim, because 
we find that Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity.  We 
will vacate in part the District Court’s subsequent order 
denying Walker leave to file a second amended complaint, so 
that the District Court may address in the first instance 
Walker’s attempt to assert a new claim under the SCA.   
                                              
66 Post-argument, the Supreme Court decided Carpenter v. 
United States, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018).  As 
Carpenter post-dates the events in question, it has no bearing 
on the state of the law pertinent to the qualified immunity 
analysis.  Any impact of Carpenter on the SCA claim is in the 
first instance for the District Court on remand.  
